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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ARBITRATION: ARBITRABILITY AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
STEPHEN

P. BEDELL*

MARY BETH CYZE**
DONN

M.

DAVIS***

I.

ARBITRABILITY

A.

Introduction

The authority of arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction
has traditionally been the topic of vigorous debate and conflicting
opinion.' Arbitrability has also been the subject of a recent pronouncement of the Illinois Supreme Court.' Specifically, the issue of
arbitrability arises when a litigant contests whether a dispute falls
within the terms of an arbitration agreement and is, therefore, subject to arbitration. Generally, this party will seek a stay of the arbitration proceedings until the issue of arbitrability is determined.3
* Partner, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Ill.; H.A.B. Xavier University,
1976; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1979.
** Associate, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Ill.; B.A. St. Mary's College,
1981; J.D. Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, 1985; formerly judicial clerk
for the Honorable Mel. R. Jiganti, Illinois Appellate Court for the First District.
*** Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Ill.; B.S. Miami University 1985; J.D.
University of Michigan Law School, 1988.
1. Compare School Dist. No. 46 v. Del Bianco, 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 215 N.E.2d
25 (1966) (prior agreement to arbitrate resulting in court order to arbitrate) with
Roosevelt Univ. v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 331 N.E.2d 835 (1975)
(distinguishing between arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims).
2. See Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr, 124 Ill. 2d 435, 530
N.E.2d 439 (1988).
3. The statutory authority for this action is contained in the Uniform Arbitration Act §2, 7 U.L.A. 68-69 (1985).
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1, and
the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall order the parties to
proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving
party, otherwise, the application shall be denied.
i(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced
or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Such an
issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the
opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
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It is settled that when the dispute is plainly arbitrable or nonarbitrable, the court can and should compel - or stay - arbitration. Moreover, it is equally settled that the ultimate determination
of arbitrability is within the province of the judiciary upon review of
the arbitration award." However, in those situations where it is unclear whether a dispute is subject to arbitration or not, who should
make the initial determination - the court or the arbitrator?
B.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Both the Uniform and Federal Arbitration Acts, and their state
counterparts, include provisions for the stay of arbitration on the
basis that the subject matter of the arbitration is not within the contemplation of the arbitration agreement.' Illinois and twenty-five
other states have adopted, with some modifications, the Uniform Arbitration Act.
The Illinois Arbitration Act parallels the Uniform Arbitration
Act, with only minor variations.' The Federal Arbitration Act also
provides for the resolution of the arbitrability issue.' These state
(c) If an issue referable to arbitration under the alleged agreement is involved
in an action or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear applications under subdivision (a) of this Section, the application shall be made
therein. Otherwise and subject to Section 18, the application may be made in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
(d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be
stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made
under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding, the
order for arbitration shall include such stay.
4. See, e.g., Unif. Arbitration Act § 12(a)(5), 7 U.L.A. (1985).
5. The pertinent provisions of the Unif. Arbitration Act, § 2 (a) and (b), are set
forth in supra note 3.
6. Section 102 of the Illinois Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part:
c. On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1, and
the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to
proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination
of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party,
otherwise, the application shall be denied.
d. On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or
threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. That issue,
when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily
tried and the stay ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10,
101-123 (1985).
7. Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement ... the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitra-
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and federal statutes all provide a mechanism for the resolution of
the arbitrability issue. The Uniform and Illinois Arbitration Acts,
however, do not specifically identify the proper forum for the resolution of the issue in the event of an ambiguous arbitration
agreement.
C. Judicial Treatment of the Arbitrability Issue
1. Recent State Court Decisions
In applying the relevant statutory provisions on the issue of
arbitrability, the judiciary of various state jurisdictions have reached
differing results. Indeed, some courts within the same jurisdiction
have disagreed as to the appropriate result.
For example, in Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc., v.
Barr,' the Illinois Supreme Court recently resolved a split that had
existed within the Illinois Appellate Court. In Barr, the plaintiff,
Donaldson, Luftkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc., a commodities futures
broker associated with the Chicago Board of Trade, hired the defendant Edwin Barr as senior vice-president of the company. As
compensation, Barr was to receive, in addition to a membership in
the Chicago Board of Trade, a straight salary, a top and bottom-line
percentage of a maximum of 5% of the gross generated from any
new business for the first year, and more importantly, 15% of the
bottom-line profit of the Chicago office activities.
Sometime after Barr ceased his employment with Donaldson,
Barr's attorney sent a demand letter to Donaldson. The letter requested over $400,000 of unpaid compensation, which apparently
represented 15% of the operating income generated from Barr's
Chicago office during his employment at Donaldson.
After Donaldson failed to comply with Barr's demand, Barr
sought arbitration before the Chicago Board of Trade, pursuant to
tion or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement ....
If the making of the arbitration agreement or the
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proIf the jury finds that an agreement for
ceed summarily to the trial thereof ....
arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
8. 124 IIl. 2d 435, 530 N.E.2d 439 (1988). The Illinois Appellate Court decision
was quickly cited with approval in three cases: Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects Int'l-Chicago, 172 Ill. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (1988); Geldermann Inc. v.
Mullins, 171 I1. App. 3d 255, 524 N.E.2d 1212 (1988); Warren Tp. High School Dist.
No. 121 v. Local 504, Federation of Teachers, 162 11. App. 3d 676, 515 N.E.2d 1331
(1987).
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Board Rule 600.00. This rule mandates arbitration of any dispute
between members "which arises out of the Exchange business of
such parties." In response, however, Donaldson contended that
Barr's dispute as to compensation did not fall within Chicago Board
of Trade business and, therefore, was not within the ambit of the
Chicago Board of Trade rule. Accordingly, Donaldson filed an application for a stay of the arbitration proceeding9 in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, on the grounds that he had not agreed to arbitrate
Barr's compensation claims.
In denying the application for stay, the trial court determined
that in cases arising under the Uniform Arbitration Act "if it is unclear whether [a claim] is arbitrable, the matter would be directed to
arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine his own jurisdiction."10 On appeal, however, the majority of the appellate court
adopted what it deemed to be the predominant approach in favor of
the trial court deciding the issue of arbitrability, and it remanded
the action to the trial court for a determination of whether the trial
court had jurisdiction to decide the claim. In contrast, the dissent by
Justice Jiganti resolved the arbitrability determination in favor of
the arbitrator. This conclusion was based upon the provisions of the
Uniform Arbitration Act itself and the public policy considerations
that underlie arbitration.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and
concluded that the initial determination of arbitrability must lie
with the arbitrator." This conclusion was contrary to a number of
Illinois decisions ruling in favor of the judicial resolution of the arbitrability issues.12 However, the Supreme Court's ruling was consistent with several prior Illinois decisions to the effect that the arbitrator, rather than the trial court, should decide the question of
arbitrability in the first instance."
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, 1 102(b) (1985) is the statutory provision followed.
10. 124 Ill. 2d 435, 440, 530 N.E.2d 439, 441.
11. Id. at 447-48, 530 N.E.2d at 445.
12. See, e.g., J & K Cement Constr. Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Ill.
App. 3d 524, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983) ("whether a dispute is within the scope of an

arbitration clause 'should be determined at the earliest possible moment and should
be controlled by judicial guidelines' ") citing Farris v. Hedgepeth, 58 Ill. App. 3d
1040, 1043, 374 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (1978) (quoting Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v. Jarman
Memorial Hosp. Bldg. Fund, Inc., 109 Ill. App. 2d 224, 229, 248 N.E.2d 289, 291
(1969)); Kelso-Burnett Co. v. Zeus Dev. Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 34, 40, 437 N.E.2d 26,
30 (1982); Iser Elec. Co., Inc v. Fossier Builders, Ltd., 84 Ill. App. 3d 161, 164, 405
N.E.2d 439, 441 (1980) (the scope of an arbitration clause should be controlled by
judicial guidelines); Paschen Contractors, Inc. v. John J. Calnan Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d

485, 489, 300 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut Corp., 367 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1966)
(applying Illinois law); Village of Westville v. Loitz Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 165 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 519 N.E.2d 37 (1988); Ozdeger v. Altay, 66 Ill. App. 3d 629, 384 N.E.2d
82 (1978) (where the scope of the arbitration clause is in doubt, the issue should be
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The Barr decision does not stand alone among recent rulings by
other state courts, many of which have supported the same result. In
Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 4 for example, a case involving a petition to compel arbitration of a percentage rental dispute
arising under a lease agreement containing an arbitration clause, the
Maryland Supreme Court held that:
[Wihen the language of an arbitration clause is unclear as to whether
the subject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate dictates that ordinarily the question of substantive arbitrability initially should be left to the decision of the
arbitrator. 8
In the earlier Maryland case of Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v.
Frederick Contractors, Inc.," the Maryland Appellate Court
explained:
A problem is created for the court when the language of the arbitration provision is unclear as to whether the subject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. In such circumstances the legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate dictates that the question should be left to
the decision of the arbitrator. Whether the party seeking arbitration is
right or wrong is a question of contract application and interpretation
for the arbitrator, not the court,... and the court should not deprive

the party seeking arbitration of the arbitrator's skilled judgment by
attempting to resolve the ambiguity.
Under such circumstances arbi7
tration should be compelled.'
In Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of University of Minnesota,1s the Supreme Court of Minnesota ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration. The Court concluded that since the intention
of the parties to arbitrate the issues was "reasonably debatable,"
arbitrability of the issues should be initially determined by the arbitrator, subject to ultimate review by the court. The Court stated:
Upon application to compel arbitration pursuant to the provisions of
the Uniform Arbitration Act (Minn. St. c. 572), where the intention of
resolved in the first instance by the arbitrators); Roosevelt Univ., 28 Ill. App. 3d at
1051, 331 N.E.2d at 841-42 (if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the subject
matter is within the scope of the arbitration agreement, then the court should refer
the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator for the initial decision); School Dist. No. 46
v. Del Bianco, 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 155, 215 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1966) (where there is an
agreement to arbitrate and its scope is reasonably in doubt, the issue of arbitrability
should be initially determined by the arbitrators).
14. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
15. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
16. 21 Md. App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (1974).
17. Id. at 321-322, 320 A.2d at 566. See also, Howard County Bd. of Educ. v.
Howard County Educ. Ass'n. Inc., 61 Md. App. 631, 487 A.2d 1220 (1985) (the arbitrator must make the determination as the "first step").
18. 266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371 (1963).
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the parties concerning the scope of the arbitration clause of their contract is clearly expressed or ascertainable, the issue of arbitrability
shall be determined by the court. Where such intention cannot be ascertained or is reasonably debatable, §572.09 limits judicial interference and requires that the scope of the arbitration clause be initially
determined by arbitration, subject to review by the court at the insistance of any contracting party. 9
In Portland Association of Teachers v. School District No. 1,"
the Oregon Appellate Court held that since the scope of grievance
procedures provided in a teachers' employment agreement was clear
on its face, it was appropriate for the court, and not an arbitrator, to
interpret the agreement. However, the Court noted that, "Only
when the agreement is ambiguous as to the scope of arbitrability
must the question of arbitrability be resolved, at least initially, by
an arbitrator." The Delaware Chancery Court in Pettinaro Construction Co. v. Harry C. Partridge,Jr., & Sons, Inc.,21 noted that,
" .. . where ambiguities relating to the issue of arbitrability exist,
the question of arbitrability itself may be submitted to the
arbitrators."2
Applying New York law, the court in Katz v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. ,2S held that the meaning and scope of an arbitration provision, as well as the arbitrability of a claim, are in the first instance,
24
questions for the arbitrators to decide.
In a number of recent decisions, other state jurisdictions have
resolved the issue contrary to Barr, concluding that the initial determination of arbitrability must be made by the court. These decisions include Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v.
Straw, 5 wherein the Michigan Appellate Court held that the arbitrability of an issue is a matter for judicial determination. In Hass19. Id. at 284, 123 N.W.2d at 372. Twelve years later in Dunshee v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 303 Minn. 473, 228 N.W.2d 567, 571 (1975), the
Minnesota Supreme Court specifically noted that the rule established in the Layne
case was reaffirmed in the 1972 case of Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of America, 292
Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972) and the 1974 case of Har-Mar Inc. v. Thorsen &
Thorshov, Inc., Minn., 300 Minn. 149, 218 N.W.2d 751 (1974).
20. 27 Or. App. 247, 555 P.2d 943 (1976).
21. 408 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1979).
22. See also, Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 22 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (construing Pennsylvania law), and Youmans. v. Dist. Court In And For the
County of Denver, 197 Colo. 28, 31, 589 P.2d 487, 489 (1979) (an arbitrator should
first decide the issue of arbitrability).
23. 438 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
24. See Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le Transport, La
Transformation et La Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (SONATRACH) v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 430 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); Pearl Street Dev. Corp.
v. Conduit and Found. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98, 359 N.E.2d 693 (1976).
25. 96 Mich. App. 773, 293 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal denied, 417 Mich. 932,
331 N.W.2d 225 (1983).
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ler v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.,2" the Pennsylvania Superior Court also held that whether a dispute is within the terms of an
arbitration agreement is for the court to determine, as did the
Maine Supreme Court in Board of School Directors v. Tri-Town
27
Teachers Association.
2.

Recent Federal Court Decisions

The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue
of arbitrability under the Federal Arbitration Act in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers.2 8 In AT&T Technologies, the Supreme Court concluded that:
It is the court's duty to interpret the agreement and to determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs predicated on a "lack of work". determination by the Company. If
the court determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the
arbitration to determine the relative merits of the parties' substantive
interpretations of the agreement. It was for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide in the first instance whether the dispute was to be resolved through arbitration.29
The lower federal courts have addressed the issue of arbitrability, and have uniformly held that it is for the court, and not
the arbitrator, to decide the issue of arbitrability
D. Arguments in Favor of the Arbitrator Making the Initial
Arbitrability Decision
1. Arguments in Favor of the Arbitrator
One of the fundamental purposes of the Uniform Arbitration
Act is "to encourage and facilitate the arbitration of disputes by
providing a speedy, informal and relatively inexpensive procedure
for resolving controversies arising out of commercial transactions. '1
26. 318 Pa. Super. 302, 464 A.2d 1354 (1983).
27. 412 A.2d 990 (Me. 1980). See also LaCourse v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 756 F.2d 10, 12 (3rd Cir. 1985) (construing Pennsylvania law) and Gaslin,
Inc. v. L.G.C. Exports, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 132, 482 A.2d 1117 (1984).
28. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
29. 475 U.S. at 651. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238,
aff'd, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
30. Local 232, Allied Indus. Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Briggs & Stratton
Corp., 837 F.2d 782, 784 (7th Cir. 1988); Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck
Drivers, Local No. -70 v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 832 F.2d 507, 509 (9th cir. 1987); Life
of America Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1984); Int'l
Union, UAW v. General Electric Co., 714 F.2d 830, 831 (8th Cir. 1983).
31. Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 287, 123
N.W.2d 371, 374 (1963).
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Since the inception of the Uniform Arbitration Act and many of its
state counterparts, the public policy of many states has been to
favor and encourage arbitration. 2 This general trend in favor of arbitration as an effective and viable dispute resolution mechanism
militates in favor of giving arbitrators the power to make the initial
determination of arbitrability.
Another factor in favor of the arbitration forum is the expertise
of the arbitrators themselves. Allowing the arbitrators, who generally possess special experience and qualifications, to make the initial
determination of arbitrability allows the trial court to take advantage of this expertise. Moreover, if ultimate judicial review of the
arbitration proceeding is sought, the trial court will have before it a
record of the arbitration proceeding which will then aid the court in
a more effective resolution of the arbitrability decision.
Finally, the most compelling reason to allow arbitrators to make
the initial arbitrability determination is evinced by those cases
where the merits of the controversy are inextricably intertwined
with the determination of the arbitrability issue. In these cases, the
court will be able to determine the arbitrability issue only after a
full evidentiary hearing. Where the hearing results in a finding of
arbitrability, the arbitrators will then perform their task and reconsider the entire matter. This will result in a waste of judicial resources, defeating the very purposes underlying the arbitration
process. 88
2. Arguments in Favor of Trial Court Making the Initial
Arbitrability Decision
Generally, courts that have determined that the initial arbitrability determination resides with the trial court do so on the basis
of a strict judicial construction of the relevant statutory provisions.
For example, Section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act states that
a dispute as to arbitrability "shall be summarily tried." It has been
argued that the term "summarily" means without delay and undue
formality and therefore subject to judicial determination. Moreover,
the term "shall" has been deemed to be mandatory language which
requires the trial court to make the arbitrability determination.
An additional argument in support of the position that the trial
32. See e.g., Schutt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 Ill. App. 3d 136, 478 N.E.2d 644
(1985); see also Pirsig, Some Comments on Arbitration Legislation and The Uniform

Act, 10 VAND. L. REV. 685, 691 (1957).
33. See Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr, 151 Ill. App. 3d
597, 607, 503 N.E.2d 786, 793 (1987) (Jiganti J., dissenting), aff'd, 124 Ill. 2d 435, 530

N.E.2d 439 (1988); see also County of Ottawa v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. 1, 25, 377
N.W.2d 668, 678 (1985) ("courts must assiduously avoid deciding the merits of the
underlying dispute in the guise of deciding arbitrability").
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court should make the initial arbitrability decision derives from the
purpose of arbitration: namely, efficient and economical resolution
of disputes. If the arbitrability determination were deferred to the
arbitrator, it would be possible that three separate determinations
would be made during the course of the arbitration proceeding.
There would be the motion to stay or compel arbitration, followed
by the arbitrator's determination of arbitrability, succeeded by the
trial court's review after the arbitration proceeding has concluded.
This series of determinations would defeat the purpose of arbitration - to provide economical adjudication of disputes.3 4 Finally, it
has been suggested that the arbitrators themselves may not want to
make the determination for fear that a decision in favor of arbitration may be criticized as a decision made out of self-interest.
E. Conclusion
As the survey indicates, the issue of who should initially make
the arbitrability decision remains split among the various state jurisdictions. In Illinois, however, it is now settled that the arbitrator
should decide the issue, with ultimate authority remaining with the
court.
II.

PUNITIvE DAMAGES

A.

Introduction

Until very recently, the judiciary had historically prohibited punitive arbitration awards. The 1974 culmination of this tradition,
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, held that an arbitrator has no power to
award punitive damages, even if agreed to by the parties.3 6 The Garrity court opined that punitive arbitration awards impinged upon
the authority of the judiciary and were prone to abuse, and were
thus violative of public policy.8" Although Garrity was frequently
followed,3 7 a number of courts implicitly acted in a way contrary to
34. See Board of Trustees of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 87 Il. App. 3d 246, 252, 408 N.E.2d 1026, 1031
(1980); Kalevitch, Arbitrability: The Uniform Arbitration Act in Illinois, 4 Loy. U.
CHi. L.J. 23, 33 (1973).
35. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (1976).
36. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
37. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 63
(8th Cir. 1984) (court acknowledged, without discussion, that if appellees argue their
fraud claims in arbitration they will be unable to recover punitive damages); Pierson
1
v. Dean, W
itter, Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (court discussed
New York law which rendered punitive damages unavailable in an arbitration award),
rev'd on other grounds, 742 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1984); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a party agreement containing an arbitration clause waives the right to seek punitive damages if that is the rule
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5
Garrity."
Put simply, the case law was in disarray, although the discernible majority followed the Garrity rule.

The modern trend in favor of punitive arbitral awards began in
1983 with the case of Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc."9
Holding that federal law applied, the Willis court was able to distinguish Garrity on the basis that it restricted the power of arbitrators
under only state law. 40 One year later, the Willis court advanced a
major step further in the case of Willoughby Roofing & Supply v.
Kajima International Inc.,'41 in which the court upheld an arbitral
award of punitive damages on its own merit. In this watershed ruling, the Willoughby court held that public policy did not prohibit
of the agreed upon controlling forum); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("Since arbitration arises out of a
contractual relationship, punitives are unavailable because parties may not contract
to benefit from or be penalized by punitive damages"); School City of E. Chicago Ind.
v. E. Chicago Federation of Teachers, Local #511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 662-63 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (arbitrator's award of punitive damages void because the award was contrary to state public policy and would not further the purposes of punitive damages);
Cone Mills Corp. v. August F. Nielsen Co., 90 A.D.2d 31, 33-34, 455 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (punitive damages unavailable in arbitration).
38. Courts implicitly acted contrary to Garrity by compelling arbitration of pu:
nitive damages claims. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978) (involving a former registered representative's claims
against a securities firm for wrongful termination); Corcoran v. Shearson/American
Express Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving claims of willful and malicious breach of fiduciary duty by customers against a commodities broker); Cullen v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving
claims by a general securities representative against its employer for alleged tortious
misconduct), aff'd, 863 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1989); Sports Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586
F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (involving claims of fraud and intentional and willful
breach of lease); Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., 583 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(involving customer's claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent
misrepresentation against a securities firm); Creson v. Quickprint of America, 558 F.
Supp. 984 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (involving licensees' allegations of fraud in inducement of
commercial franchise agreements); Ging v. Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D.
Pa. 1982) (court referred claims for punitive damages to arbitration, implicitly holding that arbitrators have the authority to consider such claims and grant the requested relief); Coudert v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, 543 F. Supp. 122 (D.
Conn. 1982) (involving a former account executive's claim of alleged defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious invasion of privacy against her
past employer), rev'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1983); Kelleher v. Reich,
532 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (involving a former chief executive's claim that he
was fraudulently induced to enter into a voting trust agreement by agents of his brokerage form); TAC Travel America Corp. v. World Airways, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 825
(S.D. N.Y. 1978) (involving a charterer's claims of defamation against an airline); Pacific Investment Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1976) (involving claims arising out of alleged misuse and mismanagement of partnership property); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So.2d 858, 861
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), (claims for punitive damages are subject to arbitration);
Van C. Argiris & Co. v. Pain/Wetzel & Assocs., 63 Ill. App. 3d 993, 380 N.E.2d 825
(1978) (involving a claim of malicious interference with a contractual relationship).
39. 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. N.C. 1983).
40. Id. at 823.
41. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
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arbitrators from making punitive damage awards. 2
Significantly, the Willoughby court reasoned that a prohibition
of punitive awards would undermine the value of arbitration and
frustrate punitive damage policy.' In apparent consensus, nearly
every decision for the past three years has followed the Willoughby
rule and upheld punitive arbitration awards." This trend has recently accelerated with a recent series of very strong, pro-arbitration
decisions.
B. Historical Overview
1.

The History of Arbitration

With the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act,' Congress established a strong federal policy favoring arbitration."6 The Federal
Arbitration Act provides that a written agreement to arbitrate in
any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' 7 The
statute further provides that any party aggrieved by the improper
refusal of another party to commence arbitration may petition a federal court of competent jurisdiction for an order compelling arbitration. If the formation of an arbitration agreement is not at issue,
"the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms [of the
agreement]. "48
Despite the mandatory language of the Federal Arbitration Act,
there has been considerable historical disagreement in the federal
judiciary over its interpretation and application. 9 However, in the
42. Id. at 359-361.
43. Id. at 362-364.
44. See, e.g., In re Costa and Head (Atrium), Ltd., 486 So.2d 1272 (Ala. 1986);
Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984); Rodgers Builders,
Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
46. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) (emphasis added). The Federal Arbitration Act also provides that, if a claim is brought before any federal court upon any issue referable to
arbitration under a written agreement, the court shall, on the application of a party,
"stay the trial until arbitration has been had in accordance with the agreement." 9
U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
49. This resulted in the common judicial refusal to enforce arbitration clauses
in disputes arising under federal remedial legislation. The judiciary has often found
arbitration to be an unsuitable method of dispute resolution, see e.g., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Applied Digital
Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Allegaert
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recent trilogy of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,5" Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,5 1 and Shearsoni
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 2 the United States Supreme
Court dispelled this interpretive confusion and significantly broadened the scope of enforceability of arbitration agreements. In Byrd,
the Supreme Court mandated the prompt arbitration of arbitrable
claims irrespective of the judicial resolution of non-arbitrable
claims. In Mitsubishi, the Court held international antitrust disputes to be arbitrable, and in McMahon, the Supreme Court held
that disputes arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act are
arbitrable.
Thus, federal policy - embodied in the Arbitration Act and the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court - unequivocally favors arbitration as a means of resolving disputes." In Mitsubishi the Supreme Court noted: "[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alv. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (holding arbitration clauses unenforceable in the areas of antitrust, lOb-5 claims and RICO
respectively) and has generally precluded arbitration in the areas of securities. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding claims brought under 1933 Securities Act
non-arbitrable).
See also Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978)
(both holding claims brought under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
lOb-5 claims non-arbitrable, following Wilko). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st cir. 1983) (excepting antitrust issues
from arbitrability) modified, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (antitrust issues excepted from
arbitration); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976) (securities laws
claims stayed pending arbitration of other issues); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1974) (antitrust claims not arbitrable); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claims inappropriate for
arbitration).
Cases holding bankruptcy arbitration unenforceable include: In re Braniff Airways, 33 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983); Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1983); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (Bankr. 3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 22 Bankr.
436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
RICO issues are addressed in: Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
602 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (adopting intertwining doctrine so that in addition
to securities claims, common law claims were not arbitrable); Universal Marine Ins.
Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. N.C. 1984) (RICO claims not arbitrable); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (non-arbitrable claims
stayed pending state claim arbitration).
50. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
51. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
52. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
53. Id. at 225-26.
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' Since 1953, every relevant
ternative means of dispute resolution."54
Supreme Court decision has favored arbitration."

With the seminal Byrd, Mitsubishi, and McMahon decisions,
the Supreme Court has swept away any doubts as to the enforceability of valid arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements have accelerated the judicial acceptance of punitive
damages as a valid component of the substantive law of
arbitrability.
2.

The History of Punitive Damages

Civil awards of punitive or exemplary damages" have been generally justified by four policy objectives.5" First, such damages punish flagrant wrongdoers and deter others from the offense.58 Second,
54. 473 U.S. at 626-27 (1984). Accord, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 124 (1982) (Arbitration Act "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration ... [and] questions of arbitrability
must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration");
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983) (in passing the Arbitration Act, "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration ... [that] mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements"). See also Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[t]here is nothing in the record ... to indicate that the
arbitral system ... would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.")
55. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614, Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213; Southland
Corp., 465 U.S. at 1 (holding preempted state laws invalidating arbitration clauses
otherwise valid under Arbitration Act); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. 1
(holding a federal district court's stay of federal suit seeking arbitration under §4 of
Arbitration Act improper); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that, where one party to a contract containing an arbitration clause claims fraud in the inducement of the contract generally, the claim
must be settled in arbitration according to the terms of the arbitration clause).
56. Punitive or exemplary damages afford a plaintiff recovery in excess of the
amount necessary to compensate for proven loss or injury. To justify such a recovery,
the aggrieved party is generally required to demonstrate that the conduct complained
of was willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, or reckless. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 205
(1973). See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 161-256 (1980) (providing a detailed discussion of the standards employed by various courts in the assessment of
punitive damages).
57. See Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in
Present-DaySociety, 49 U. Mo. KAN. Crrv L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1980); Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 875-79 (1976).
58. J. GHIRDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGE LAW AND PRACTICE §4.14 n.1
(1981) (citing cases and statutes from 36 states and the District of Columbia) (1984).
As a noted torts commentator has observed:
The idea of punishment and deterrence usually does not enter into tort law,
except in so far as it may lead the courts to balance the scales somewhat in
favor of the plaintiff's interest in determining that a tort has been committed
in the first place. In one rather anomalous respect, however, an element of the
criminal law has invaded the field of torts. Where the defendant's wrongdoing
has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to
award in the tort action "punitive" or "exemplary" damages. Such damages are
given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for his injuries, for
the purpose of punishing the defendant, and of deterring others from following

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 22:603

punitive damages are monetary awards that supplement compensatory damages.8 9 Third, punitive awards offer an element of revenge
both to the injured party and to society as a whole. 0 Fourth, punitive awards promote justice by providing an incentive to pursue
causes of action where the damages are nominal, but where the defendant's behavior subjects society to substantial risks.
Not surprisingly, punitive damages have come under harsh attack in recent years.6 1 Many commentators perceive that the claims
for, and awards of, punitive damages increased greatly in the past
few years.6 2 Critics also perceive that the size of awards have grown
steadily, and that an ever larger number of verdicts can properly be
described as excessive.6 1 In reality, punitive awards have grown in
size and absolute number, but have not grown in relative
frequency."
An array of arguments have advanced against the theory and
his example.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, §2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971).

59. Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Kentucky view punitive damages as purely compensatory. H. OLECK, DAMAGES To PERSONS AND PROPERTY §269
(1961); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §77 (1935). Texas, Idaho, and Oregon view compensation as one of the major function of punitive awards. Long, supra note 57, at 875.
See Comment, Punitive Damages: A Cat's Clavicle in Modern Civil Law, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 657 (1989) (argues punitive damages initially permitted to compensate
otherwise non-compensable intangible injuries).
60. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 205, 221 (1973).
61. See, e.g., Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its
Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages, 56 S.CAL. L. REV. 1, 76-78 (1982); Long, supra note 57, at 888-89;
Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline,
11 FORUM 57 (1975); Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411
(1972); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished (Def. Research Inst., 1969).
62. See Morrison, Punitive Damages and Why the Reinsurer Cares, 20 FORUM
73 (1984); Belli, supra note 57; Ellis, supra note 61, at 2; TRB: The Tort Explosion,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1985, at 4.
63. See Sales & Cole, supra note 61, at 1154.
64. The total amount awarded in 1980-84 was six times greater than in 1975-79
in the Circuit Court of Cook County (Cook County) and twice as much in the San
Francisco Superior Court (San Francisco). The size of a typical punitive award also
increased from $20-30,000 before 1980, to $50-60,000 after 1980, representing a doubling in San Francisco and nearly fourfold increase Cook County. Finally, the size of
the largest awards also increased, especially in Cook County. As to the number of
punitive awards, between 1975 and 1985 the number increased by 67% in Cook
County and 53% in San Francisco. However, this "increased number" still represented a very small number and proportion of cases: 50 cases in San Francisco and 65
in Cook County from 1980-84, representing only 8% of trials and 14% of plaintiff's
verdicts in San Francisco and only 4% of trials and 6% of plaintiff's verdicts in Cook
County. More importantly, despite the increase in absolute number, the relative frequency of punitive awards, in proportion to the number of trials and number of
plaintiff's verdicts, remained almost unchanged over the entire 25-year period, in
both jurisdictions. Peterson, Sarma, & Shanley, Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings 8-45 (Rand Institute 1980).
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practice of punitive damages. 5 The most cogent criticism is that punitive damages are no longer necessary. First, critics note that the
compensatory damages concept was broadened long ago to include
total compensation - including tangible and intangible, direct and
indirect harm - removing compensation as a justification for punitive damages." Second, commentators argue that the punishment
rationale is inappropriate for civil litigation, and that punitive damages should be confined to criminal law.6 7 Third, critics contend that
the availability of liability insurance to cover punitive damage
awards vitiates the punishment and deterrence rationales.6 Finally,
at least one commentator believes that the public justice rationale is
rarely applicable.6 9
The same factors that have led commentators to criticize punitive damages in the judicial setting have led the courts to resist the
application of the doctrine in the arbitration setting. By the same
token, the beneficent goals of punitive awards are equally well
served in arbitration. More importantly, the Supreme Court's proarbitration stance favors the inclusion of punitive damages as an arbitration remedy, in order to most fully compensate the injured
party and punish the wrongdoer.
III.
A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION

Pre-Willoughby: Hostility to Punitive Awards
1.

Garrity: Prohibitionof Punitive Award

In 1974, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.7" was the first case to hold
unequivocally that punitive damages could not be awarded in arbitration under a modern arbitration statute. In Garrity, a prominent
author sued her publisher for fraudulent inducement and "gross"
underpayment of royalties, as well as for various "malicious" acts.
Garrity's contract contained a broad arbitration provision. The arbitration panel awarded Garrity $45,000 in compensatory damages
and $7,500 in punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals, in
a 4-3 decision, vacated the award of punitive damages.
The Garrity majority articulated a sweeping rule: "An arbitra65. See Long, supra note 57, at 883-89; Sales, supra note 61, at 1154-1171.
66. Long, supra note 59, at 888; Sales, supra note 61, at 1164-1165.
67. See Long, supra note 59, at 884-85; Sales, supra note 61, at 1159. Both commentators note that civil parties are being subjected to quasi-criminal penalties without the procedural safeguards afforded under criminal law.
68. A majority of jurisdictions have judicially declared that punitive damages
are insurable. Ellis, supra note 61, at 71; Morrissey, Punitive Damages - Insurability,
24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 257 (1987).

69. Long, supra note 59, at 889.
70. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
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tor has no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by
the parties....,",At the root of the Garrity doctrine is the notion
that freedom to contract does not include the freedom to impose
penalties.7 2 If parties may not agree to punish, and the sole source of
an arbitrator's power is the agreement, then the arbitrator has no
grounds upon which to levy punitive sanctions.
The public policy expressed in Garrity, which the court believed was "of such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its contravention,"' ' 7 was supported by several rationales. First,
the court noted that punitive damages have not been awarded in
breach of contract actions on a historical basis.7 Second, the court
reasoned that allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages would
"amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial power," thereby displacing courts as the arbiters of social justice.7 5 Third, the court observed that the absence of guidelines for arbitral awards, coupled
with the limited range of judicial supervision, might result in unpredictable and uncontrollable awards.7 Fourth, the court theorized
that one party could obtain an unfair advantage through manipulation of the arbitrator.7 7 Finally, the court speculated that punitive
arbitration awards would erode confidence in the arbitral process
78
and discourage its use.
2.

The Post-Garrity - Pre-WiUoughby Period

Although Garrity was severely criticized, 79 it was frequently followed for the proposition that punitive damages are not available in
arbitration." Many courts acted contrary to the Garrity rule, how71. 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (emphasis added).
72. "The law does not and should not permit private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved to the State. The freedom of contract does not embrace the freedom to punish, even by contract." Id. at 360, 353
N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
73. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
74. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
75. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
76. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Hackett, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a
Workable rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 287-300 (1978) and Zerden, Arbitration: The
Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy Question, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 546, 551 (1976).
80. See Surman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 63 (8th
Cir. 1984) (Eighth Circuit acknowledged, without discussion, that if appellees argue
their fraud claims in arbitration they will not be able to recover punitive damages);
Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Ill. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court applied New York law
which rendered punitive damages unavailable in an arbitration award); Baselski v.
Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (a party
to an agreement containing an arbitration clause has waived the right to seek puni-
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ever, compelling arbitration of punitive damage claims along with
other types of controversies within the scope of the arbitration
agreement."1 Although these decisions failed to directly address the
appropriateness of punitive damages in arbitration, they indicated
dissatisfaction with, or confusion over, the Garrity ruling. At least
two state appellate courts went further, however, and held that an
arbitration panel has the authority to award punitive damages although neither court discussed Garrity.2 At the same time, the

First Circuit upheld an arbitral award despite its conclusion that the
tive damages in any forum); United States Fidelity & Guar. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d
429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("Since arbitration arises out of a contractual relationship, punitive damages are unavailable because parties may not contract to benefit
from or be penalized by punitive damages"); School City of E. Chicago, Ind., v. E.
Chicago, Federation of Teachers, Local #511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (holding an arbitrator's award of punitive damages void because the award was
contrary to state public policy and would not further the purposes of punitive damages); Cone Mills Corp. v. August F. Nielsen Co., 90 A.D.2d 31, 33-34, 455 N.Y.S.2d
625, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (punitive damages unavailable in arbitration).
81. See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978) (involving a former
registered representative's claims against a securities firm for wrongful termination),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948; Corcoran v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 596 F. Supp.
1113 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving claims of willful and malicious breach of fiduciary
duty by customers against a commodities broker); Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving claims by a general securities representative against its employer for alleged tortious misconducts); Sports
Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (involving claims of fraud
and intentional and willful breach of lease); Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 583 F.
Supp. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (involving a customer's claim of negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation against a securities firm); Creson v.
Quickprint of America, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (involving licensees'
allegations of fraud in inducement of commercial franchise agreements); Ging v.
Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (the court referred claims for
punitive damages to arbitration, implicitly holding that arbitrators have the authority
to consider such claims and grant the requested relief); Coudert v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, 543 F. Supp. 122 (D. Conn. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d
78 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving a former account executive's claim of alleged defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious invasion of privacy against
her past employer); Kelleher v. Reich, 532 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (involving a
former chief executive's claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a voting
trust agreement by agents of his brokerage firm); Horne v. New England Patriots
Football Club, 489 F. Supp. 465 (D. Mass 1980) (involving a public relations director's claim of breach of contract arising out of his termination); TAC Travel America
Corp. v. World Airways, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (involving a charterer's claims of defamation against an airline); Pacific Investment Co. v. Townsend,
58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1976) (involving claim arising out of alleged
misuse and mismanagement of partnership property); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v. Melamed, 453 So.2d 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), affd., 476 So.2d 140
(1985) (holding that the claims for punitive damages are subject to arbitration); Van
C. Argiris & Co. v. Pain/Wetzel & Assocs., 63 Ill. App. 3d 993, 380 N.E.2d 825 (1978)
(involving a claim of malicious interference with a contractual relationship).
82. Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, 44 Md. App. 688, 690, 410
A.2d. 630, 632 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (under the health care malpractice claim
statute, arbitration panel has authority to award punitive damages); Grissom v.
Greener & Sumner Const. Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that since the arbitration agreement expressly allowed punitive damages, there was
no basis for modifying an arbitration award which included punitive damages).
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award was punitive in nature.13
The first clear break from the Garrity rule occurred in Willis v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.84 The Willis case involved a customer-brokerage agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out
of transactions between the parties. The customer complained of
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. He requested punitive damages.
The customer opposed the brokerage firm's request for arbitration,
fearing that the arbitrators would apply New York law (as required
in the arbitration clause), and therefore apply the Garrity rule and
deny him punitive damages.
The court, however, applied the Federal Arbitration Act, because the agreement between the parties evidenced a transaction in
interstate commerce. 85 Thus, the court was able to distinguish Garrity on the ground that it restricted the power of arbitrators only
under New York state law, not federal law. 6 Although the arbitration clause did not refer to punitive damages, the court concluded
that the broad language of the arbitration provision included claims
for punitive damages since: (1) public policy did not prohibit arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages, and; (2) any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitration should be resolved in
87
favor of arbitration.
B.

Willoughby: The Approval of Punitive Arbitral Awards

The seminal case for the validity of awards of punitive arbitral
awards is Willoughby Roofing & Supply v.Kajima International
Inc.8s In Willoughby, the arbitration panel awarded the Willoughby
Roofing Co. $41,091 in compensatory damages and $108,909 in punitive damages, based upon a finding of "willful misrepresentations of
material fact.89
The Willoughby court applied federal law90 and federal policy
contained in the Federal Arbitration Act because the construction
83. Cadillac Auto Co. v. Metro. Auto. Salesman, 588 F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir.
1978).
84. 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. N.C. 1983).
85. Id. at 823.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 824.
88. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 354-55.
90. Even though the parties to the contract agreed that Alabama law should
govern the resolution of issues submitted to arbitration, the court found that "federal
law governs the categories of claims subject to arbitration [and the] resolution of issues concerning the arbitration provision's interpretation, construction, validity, revocability, and enforceability." Id. at 359 (citing Willis v. Shearson/American Express,

Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823-24 (M.D. N.C. 1983)) (emphasis in original).
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contract was a transaction involving interstate commerce to which
the policies and provisions of the Arbitration Act apply.9 1 The Willoughby court held that the standard arbitration clause was broad
enough to empower the arbitration panel to award punitive damages. 2 To arrive at this conclusion, the court initially noted that the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration requires the liberal construction of arbitration agreements.93 Since arbitrators have broad
remedial powers to fashion a remedy,9 ' the court continued, the specific remedy need not be authorized by the arbitration agreement."
Rather, the court stated, any limitation upon the arbitrator's broad
remedial powers should be clearly and expressly stated in the arbitration agreement.9 Since the arbitration agreement in Willoughby
did not expressly prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive dambe empowered to handle "all disages, the arbitration panel should
97
putes," the court concluded.
Next, the Willoughby court carefully analyzed, and rejected, the
theoretical underpinnings of the Garrity doctrine. First, the court
rejected Garrity's fear of the displacement of the judicial system,
noting that this was the very purpose of the Arbitration Act.98 Second, the Willoughby court observed that the purposes of punitive
damages would be furthered by arbitral award every bit as much as
by judicial awards. 9 Moreover, the Willoughby court reasoned that
an arbitrator's expertise in the relevant field would often put him in
the best position to discern appropriate punitive awards. 10 0
C. Post-Willoughby: The Growing Modern Trend
Since the watershed Willoughby ruling, courts have had the opportunity to directly address the issue of the arbitrability of punitive damages in arbitration in a number of cases. The overwhelming
weight of authority is to allow punitive damages in arbitration; indeed, only one post-Willoughby case has failed to follow the Willoughby rule.' 0'
91. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 359. For this reason, the trial court distinguished Garrity, which restricted the power of arbitrators only under New York law,
not federal law.
92. Id. at 357.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 357-8.
95. Id. at 357.
96. Id. at 358.
97. Id. at 357.
98. Id. at 363 (citing, Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The case which does not follow Willoughby is Shaw v. Kuhnel & Associates, Inc., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985). In Shaw, the plaintiff brought an action
for breach of contract and fraud, seeking punitive damages. The New Mexico Su-
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In the 1984 case of Baker v. Sadick,0 2 the California Court of
Appeals affirmed an arbitrator's award of $300,000 in punitive damages under a state statute providing for arbitration of medical malpractice claims. Dr. Sadick claimed on appeal that the arbitrator's
awarding of punitive damages violated California law and public
policy. The Baker court disagreed, stating that public policy, at least
in California, favored arbitration. 10 3 The court thought it most important that arbitration be placed on equal footing with judicial proceedings stating: "[airbitration serves as a substitute for proceedings
in court. As a substitute, arbitration would not be encouraged by a
decision which effectively holds a claim, which may otherwise be as10 4
serted in a court of law, may not be asserted in arbitration.
In the 1988 case of Belko v. AVX Corp.,'05 the California Court
of Appeals refined the Baker analysis in its affirmance of the confirmation of an arbitrator's award of punitive damages for wrongful
termination arising from the breach of an employment contract.
AVX Corporation contended that the award of $500,000 in punitive
damage was: (1) contrary to the "majority rule" against arbitral
awards of punitive damages; and (2) beyond the scope of the express
language of the employment agreement.'e The Belko court, characterizing Garrity as an anomaly and concluding that the Garrity rule
is unduly restrictive, rejected the traditional "majority rule" represented by that decision. 10 7 After a thorough examination of the jurisprudential considerations affecting the issues, the Belko court concluded that public policy,' freedom to contract,' 09 judicial policy,"0
preme Court, in dicta, stated, "We also determine that an arbitrator should not be

given authority to award punitive damages. This power is reserved to the courts." Id.
at 609, 698 P.2d at 882 (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stewart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353
N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976)). The Shaw court did not mention Willoughby,
discuss Garrity, or explicate the issue of punitive damages. Clearly, Shaw is an

anomaly.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
Id. at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
Id. at 628-29, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83.
204 Cal. App. 3d 894, 251 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1988).
Id. at 900-06, 251 Cal. Rptr. 562-67.

107. Id.
108. The Belko court discussed the applicable public policies in the following

terms:

We find no public policy significant enough to restrict the right of contracting
parties to vesting agreed upon arbitrators with the authority t6 consider and
resolve claims for punitive damages. Indeed, a contrary holding violates those
strong public policy considerations supporting arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, requiring the courts to liberally construe the contractual language within the arbitration clause and recognize the remedial flexibility of arbitrators' authority.
Id. at 902, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
109. "We believe the most practical rule consistent with fairness is one which
permits the parties to expressly confer the power to award punitive damages upon an
arbitrator." Id. at 901, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
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and practical considerations' militate in favor of the validity of arbitral awards of punitive damages. On the other hand, the Belko
court determined that neither the possibility" 2 of incompetent arbitrators,11 3 the displacement of courts as the arbiters of social sanctions,"' the limited judicial review of arbitrator's awards," 5 nor the
private enforcement of penal sanctions, "' dictated the elimination
of punitive damages from the wide range of arbitration remedies.
Perhaps the most important discussion in the Belko opinion
concerned the source of the arbitrator's power to award punitive
damages. The court posited that exemplary damages may not be
awarded by an arbitrator in the absence of an express provision in
the arbitration agreement authorizing such relief, or a stipulated
submission order or its legal equivalent." 7 Thereupon, the court observed that the contractual arbitration provision itself could not
form the basis of consent to exemplary relief, since the provision did
not expressly permit an award of punitive damages."'
Accordingly, the Belko court next considered whether an express understanding as to the availability of punitive damages existed outside the four corners of the contractual arbitration provision. The court concluded that the claimant placed the issue of
punitive damages before the arbitrator both by the pleadings (i.e.,
the claimant's statement of claim), and by the evidence. Concomitantly, the court found that the issue was not removed from the
scope of arbitral review by the defendant, either by means of an affirmative defense or an objection to specific evidence."' On that ba110. Id. at 900-06, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 562-67.
111. Id. at 906, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
112. "[T]he mere possibility of bias or corruption no more justifies a wholesale
withdrawal of the authority of arbitrators to make an award of punitive damages than
it would a wholesale withdrawal of their authority to resolve disputes at all. Id. at
903, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 564, quoting, Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajima Int'l.
Inc., 598 F. Supp. at 362.
113. Id. at 902-03, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 901-02, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63.
116. Id.
117. This view is embraced by several courts and jurisdictions. See, e.g., Intern.
Ass'n of Heat & General Pipe Covering, 792 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1986); Howard P. Foley
Co. v. Int'l. Bro. of Elec. Workers, 789 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Baltimore Regional
Joint Bd. v. Webster Clothes, 596 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. v. Intern. Broth., 561 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1977); Westmoreland Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 550 F. Supp. 1044 (W.D. Va. 1982); Sweeney v. Morganroth, 451 F. Supp.
367 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Int'l U. of Op. Eng., Local 450 v. Mid-Valley, Inc, 347 F. Supp.
1104 (S.D. Tex. 1972); and Kennewick Educ. Ass'n v. Kennewick School Dist., 666
P.2d 928 (Wash. App. 1983).
118. It should be noted that the contractual arbitration provision did not expressly prohibit exemplary awards. Belko, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 896, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
559.
119. The defendant's answer raised as its sole affirmative defense that plaintiff
was "required by agreement and law to arbitrate the disputes and claims contained
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sis, the court concluded that the parties had jointly submitted the
issue of punitive damages to the arbitrator.'
Under the Belko doctrine, a claimant is not necessarily stymied
by the existence of a contractual arbitration provision which is silent
as to punitive awards. Rather, the Belko rule places the burden on
the respondent to contest the arbitrability of punitive damages - so
long as the plaintiff has expressly sought punitive damages. Effectively, the Belko rule provides that a party may ensure the preclusion of an arbitral award of punitive damages only by means of an
express prohibition in the arbitration agreement, to the effect that
claims for punitive damages are not subject to arbitration.
In Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds,12 1 the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit solidly reaffirmed the Willoughby rule
in favor of punitive damages in arbitration. 12

2

Although the Elev-

enth Circuit was compelled to reverse the punitive damages award
because of perjured testimony, the court found ample authority both
in precedent and in the arbitration agreement for the arbitrator's
power to award punitive damages. The court, in a partial restatement of the Willoughby holding, concluded that a state choice of
law provision does not deprive an arbitrator of the power to award
punitive damages under the Federal Arbitration Act.1 23 The court
did, however, conclude that the choice of law provision established
"the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply in determining
whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of punitive
damages.'

2

4

Thus, the door may be open for a court to vacate an

arbitrator's punitive award if the arbitrator contravened the
sub1 2
stantive state law mandated by the choice of law provision. 1
In Ehrich v.A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,2 the South Dakota
federal district court upheld an arbitrator's award of $97,341 in exemplary damages in an action involving mismanagement of a commodities fund stating that "Willoughby furnishes the final authority
on the issue of whether punitive damages can be awarded ....

7

The Court found Garrity inapplicable since federal law, not state
(in the complaint)". Furthermore, the answer did not suggest that the arbitral remedy was, or should be, limited to compensatory damages. Id. at 905, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
566.
120. Id.
121. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 1387.
123. The court, in a footnote citing Willoughby, stated that the Arbitration Act
would not override a clear provision in a contract prohibiting an arbitrator from
awarding punitive damages. Id.
124. Id. at 1387.
125. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration, CoM. DAMAGES REP. 175, 178-79 (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter Commercial Arbitration].
126. 675 F. Supp. 559 (D. S.D. 1987).
127. Id. at 564.
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law, applied to the present case. 28 The Court based its ruling on the
strong federal policy in favor of upholding an arbitrator's ability to
fashion appropriate remedies and the legislative history of the Commodity Exchange Act supporting the remedy of arbitration.' 29
In Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 30 the Middle District of Florida similarly relied on Willoughby in confirming an arbitrator's
award of exemplary damages in a securities law case governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act. The court, after noting that the parties' arbitration agreement authorized the arbitration panel to fashion any
appropriate remedy, and stating that a federal court "is to resolve
all doubt in favor of the arbitrator's authority to award a particular
remedy,"' 8' was unable to find that the panel's award of punitive
damages exceeded its authority."32
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen," 3 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a punitive damage claim was arbitrable
under the North Carolina arbitration statute. Rodgers Builders, Inc.
filed a variety of fraud claims against the contractor pursuant to the
construction contract which contained a broad arbitration clause.
The plaintiff was awarded the aggregate of $407,259 on all claims.""
The Rodgers court affirmed a grant of summary judgment and rejected the contractor's contention that the punitive damage claim
was not arbitrable, stating: "We detect no public policy in this State
prohibiting the arbitration of claims for punitive damages which fall
within the scope of an arbitration agreement .... "I'll
In In re Costa and Head (Atrium), Ltd.," 6 the Alabama Supreme Court cited Willoughby in affirming an award of punitive
damages in a construction dispute pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. 3 ' Similarly, in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Wise, 38 the Arizona Appellate Court upheld an arbitrator's award of
punitive damages against an automobile insurer. The court noted
that the automobile insurance policy, pursuant to which the insured
filed his claim, did not specifically exclude punitive damages from
its uninsured motorist coverage.
128.
129.
130.
131.
353 (N.D.
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 565.
677 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
Id. at 1139 (citing Willoughby Roofing v. Kajima Int'l., Inc., 598 F. Supp.
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269, 270 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Id. at 1139.

76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
Id. at 18, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 24, 331 S.E.2d at 734.
486 So.2d 1272 (Ala. 1968).
Id. at 1276.
150 Ariz. 16, 721 P.2d 674 (1986).
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In Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Construction,3 9 the Texas
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and upheld an arbitrator's
award of $65,000 in punitive damages for breach of contract and independent tortious conduct in a construction setting. 4 0 The court's
holding turned on two findings: first, that the arbitration agreement
expressly encompassed exemplary relief;"" and second, that the arbitrator's award of punitive damages was not contrary to public policy."" Interestingly, the court noted that it was not necessary that
the arbitral remedy be available at law or equity to render such relief pursuant to the Texas Arbitration statute."4 3
In addition to the foregoing precedents expressly upholding an
arbitral award of punitive damages, other decisions have compelled
the arbitration of claims in which exemplary damages are requested.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fennerand Smith, Inc. v. Melamed,4'T the
court held that a customer's claim of fraud and prayer for punitive
damages arising from account mismanagement was subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in light of the Supreme
Court's mandate that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues under the Federal Arbitration Act are to be resolved in favor
of arbitration.' 5 In Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. v. McFadden,' 6 the court referred a claim which demanded punitive
damages to arbitration, citing Melamed for the proposition that
claims for punitive damages are subject to arbitration."' 7
It should also be noted that a number of post-Willoughby decisions have implicitly recognized the arbitrability of punitive damage
claims. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc.,' 8 the Supreme Court ordered arbitration of an antitrust claim,
including the claim for treble damages under the statute. In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,' the Supreme Court approved arbitration of RICO claims, including the claim for treble
damages under the statute. The decisions in three recent securities
cases: Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc.;150 Schriner v. Bear,
Stearns, & Co.; 5' and Ex parte Thomson McKinnon Securities,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App. 1984).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.
453 So.2d 858 (Fla. App. 1984).
Id. at 861.
509 So.2d 1212 (Fla. App. 1987).
Id. at 1213.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
635 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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Inc.;1 52 demonstrate similar tacit judicial recognition of the appropriateness of arbitrating claims in which punitive awards are an element of possible relief."'3
IV.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of jurisprudence in this area reveals the basic
tension between the modern doctrine favoring arbitration and judicial perceptions of the inherent limitations of the arbitration process.154 Nevertheless, the case law reveals that the clear trend is to
empower arbitrators to award punitive damages.

152. 517 So.2d 614 (Ala. 1987).
153. Commercial Arbitration, supra note 125, at 172.
154. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953, 970-72 (1986).

